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CASE COMMENTS

lots regarded the restrictive agreement as something which added
to the value of their land. Burges v. City of St. Paul, 241 Minn.
285, 64 N.W.2d 73 (1954); City of Shelbyville v. Kilpatrick, 204
Tenn. 484, 322 S.W.2d 203 (1959).
But other courts have held to the contrary. Restrictive covenants
do not rise to the dignity of an estate in the land itself but are contractual rights not binding on the sovereign contemplating a public
use of the particular property taken. Friesen v. City of Glendale,
209 Cal. 524, 288 Pac. 1080 (1930); Anderson v. Lynch, 188
Ga. 154, 3 S.E.2d 85 (1939). In State v. City of Dunbar, 142
W. Va. 332, 338, 95 S.E.2d 457, 461 (1956), the court said,
"....

those who enter into such covenants do so with the

knowledge that the government has the absolute right to acquire
lands for governmental purposes, and they can not be presumed to have intended an interference with such right."
Because of the unique fact situation in the principal case, the
court had difficulty in determining whether the covenant was a
compensable interest. Three dissenting judges held that the plaintiff
did not have a compensable interest on the basis that the covenant
was personal and did not run with the land. The Ohio court has
held that owners of a restrictive covenant don't have a compensable
interest. Norfolk & W. Ry. v. Gale, 119 Ohio St. 110, 162 N.E.
385 (1928); Doan v. Cleveland Short Line Ry., 92 Ohio St. 461,
112 N.E. 505 (1915). Thus, the majority in the principal case
seem to hold that this covenant created a greater interest in the
land than a restrictive covenant.
Ward Day Stone, Jr.

Equity-Clean Hands
Suit to replace a lost deed. In 1934 A, the sole stockholder and
concededly alter ego of P corporation, conveyed property to B, his
son, without consideration. B agreed to hold the property for A's
benefit. The purpose of the conveyance was to conceal the property from A's creditors. In 1945 A filed a petition in bankruptcy
in which he swore that he had no interest in real property. In 1950
B at A's request conveyed the property to D who was A's son-in-law.
This conveyance was without consideration. A discharged B's earlier
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promise and obtained a similar promise from D. D conveyed the
property to P corporation in 1950. The deed was not recorded and
was subsequently lost. P brought this suit to have the deed replaced.
The Supreme Court, Appellate Division, reversed lower court's
decision granting relief demanded. P appealed. Held, reversed. The
majority of the court reasoned that the theory of unclean hands was
not a bar to relief. The equitable relief sought was not to enforce
an executory obligation arising out of an illegal transaction but to
protect legal ownership. The wrongs done by A prior to acquisition
of the title now in issue may not now be raised by D to defeat
relief. The two dissenting judges were of the opinion that these
transactions were a carefully calculated plot on A's part to keep
the property within the family and away from creditors. They felt
that the doctrine of "unclean hands" was applicable and A was not
entitled to relief. Seagirt Realty Corp. v. Chazanof, 246 N.Y.S.2d
613 (1963).
The doctrine of "clean hands" is of ancient heritage and is one
of the fundamental doctrines of equitable jurisprudence. Today,
no principle is better settled than the maxim that he who comes into
equity must come in with clean hands or be denied relief regardless
of the merits of the claim. Precision Instrument Mfg. Co. v. Automotive Maintenance Mach. Co., 324 U.S. 806 (1945); Liberman
v. Liberman, 142 W. Va. 716, 98 S.E.2d 275 (1957). The maxim
is not applied for the benefit of the defendant but is for the protection of the court based on the principle that equity will not be an
agent in helping carry out a fraud. Further, the application of the
doctrine is not dependent on whether the defendant raises an objection, but can be applied by the court on its own motion. MCCLINTOCK, EQUITY § 26 (1948). There are, however, certain limitations upon the application of the principle.
In order for the doctrine of "unclean hands" to apply to bar a
claim, plaintiff must have committed acts of unconscionable conduct relating to the very activity that is the basis of his claim.
Relief will not be refused merely because of plaintiff's general
bad character nor because of particular acts of misconduct not
directly involved in the suit. McLaughlin v. McLaughlin, 187 A.2d
905 (Pa. 1963).
In the case of White v. Graham, 112 W. Va. 451, 164 S.E. 664
(1932), B and C by misrepresentation and fraud convinced A to
convey his property to them. The property was to be held by them
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"to save it" and was to be reconveyed upon A's request. A asked for
reconveyance of the property. B and C set up their defense on the
basis that the conveyance was made to defraud A's creditors and to
show the general bad character of A. There was no fraud on
creditors. The court held that A was entitled to a reconveyance.
The "unclean hands" doctrine did not apply because A's fraud did
not apply to the transaction in litigation.
The problem often arises in determining whether the "bad"
conduct is a part of the "same transaction" which now serves as
basis for the claim. The courts are not in agreement on what test
should be used. New York N. H. & H. R. v. Pierce Coach Lines,
281 Mass. 479, 183 N.E. 836 (1933); City of Wink v. Griffith
Amusement Co., 129 Tex. 40, 100 S.W.2d 695 (1936). However,
it is recognized that if the plaintiff can prove his case without
reference to fraudulent elements in the facts he can have relief.
Zak v. Zak, 305 Mass. 194, 25 N.E. 2d 169 (1940); Highland v.
Davis, 119 W. Va. 501, 195 S.E. 604 (1937). In the instant case
plaintiff could prove his case without referring to the fraud of 1934.
Plaintiff's cause of action arose not because of the fraud, but because the deed was lost.
The dissenting opinions were based on the theory that these
transactions were all in a scheme to defraud creditors. Admitting
that this is all one transaction and that it was done with the intent
to defraud creditors, there is another ground upon which plaintiff
is entitled to relief. In the instant case the plaintiff was not relying
upon an illegal executory contract but a contract which had been
executed. All the courts are in agreement as to the application of
the "unclean hands" doctrine where the plaintiff is trying to enforce an illegal executory contract. Thus where A transfers property to B to defraud his creditors and B promises to hold the property
for A until the trouble has passed, the doctrine is applicable when
A seeks specific performance of the agreement. A is not entitled
to force B to reconvey the property when the trouble ceases to exist
because of the fraud. In this situation A would be suing upon the
fraudulent executory contract. Fyffe v. Lyon, 274 Ky. 399, 118
S.W.2d 745 (1938); Poling v. Williams, 55 W. Va. 69, 46 S.E. 604
(1904). Further, equity will leave the parties asserting rights founded
upon an illegal contract in the situation in which they have thereby
placed themselves and deny relief from or under the contract.
Smith v. Smith, 255 Wis. 96, 38 N.W.2d 12 (1949). In the instant
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case, however, plaintiff was not suing upon the illegal contract but
was suing for the replacement of a lost deed.
In Hertzler v. Geigley, 196 Pa. 419, 46 At. 366 (1900), the
court stated that if an illegal agreement has in fact been executed
by the parties and the illegal purpose of the contract has been accomplished the court will not invade the transaction to discover its
origin. As between fraudulent grantor and fraudulent grantee, title
passes and only creditors upon whom the fraud is perpetrated have
a right to attack the conveyance to have it set aside. Solins v.
White, 128 W. Va. 189, 36 S.E.2d 132 (1945). In the principal
case the defendant was not a victim of the fraud, and he should
not be allowed to point to some prior fraud of plaintiff's as a ground
for not making a new deed.
In the instant case the doctrine of "unclean hands" was rightly held
inapplicable. The fraud in question did not arise out of the matter
in litigation. The plaintiff's cause of action arose out of an occurrence separate and apart from the illegal contract. The plaintiff
owned the property absolutely and was not seeking specific performance of a prior agreement. When the defendant delivered the
deed to plaintiff in the prior conveyance title passed. The plaintiff
was seeking some physical evidence of a title which he already had.
The title standing in defendant's name was misleading the public
and would continue to mislead them as to the true owner of the
property until the record title was corrected.
Fred Adkins

Estate Tax-Marital Deduction Formula Clause
Testator provided by a clause in his will that should his wife survive him, she was to receive a bequest equal to one-half the value
of his adjusted gross estate, after deducting all debts, funeral, and
administration expenses. Iis executors deducted the administration expenses on the estate's income tax return, which in turn increased the actual value of the adjusted gross estate for estate tax
purposes. Executors computed the wife's share on the basis of the
higher adjusted gross estate and accordingly claimed a higher
marital deduction in the estate tax return. Commissioner rejected
the executor's marital deduction figure and set the amount passing
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